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RECOGNIZING THE DISABILITY:
EXTENDING THE (TENUOUS) RIGHTS OF
ENGLISH-LANGUAGE-DEFICIENT
STUDENTS IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS
Recently, . a specialist in bilingual education discussed with
thoughtful concern the way a large school system might
develop a bilingual program for children of Mexican migrant
workers. Following this he was asked, "What would you do if
in your school system you had, not several hundred children,
but only four or five children?" His answer was abrupt and
startling: "Forget them."'
I. INTRODUCTION
Every year, millions of physically and mentally disabled children
enroll in public schools under the protection of federal and state
disability acts. In order to comply with these laws, many schools
attempt to accommodate disabled children's special needs by taking
1. Virginia G. Allen, The Non-English Speaking Child in Your Classroom, 30 READING
TEACHER 504, 504 (1977).
2. During the years 1993-1994, 5,318,021 children ranging in age from birth to twenty-
one years old benefited from the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C.
§§ 1400-1491o (1994), and the Chapter I program of the Improving America's Schools Act of
1994, 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301-6514. See NATIONAL CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF
EDUC., DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS 65 (1996) [hereinafter DIGEST OF EDUCATION
STATISTICS]. The IDEA, originally enacted as the Education for All Handicapped Children Act
(EAHCA), Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (1975), was the first federal statute securing an
equal educational opportunity for disabled children. For examples of state disabilities acts, see
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 380.1701 (West 1996); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-109 (1997); and
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3323.02 (West 1997).
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measures such as purchasing special equipment,3 hiring special
education teachers,4 or installing elevator systems. Every year,
however, millions of other disabled students who wish to enter public
schools are not afforded such accommodations for their disabilities.
These students include English-Language-Deficient (ELD) students, 6
who, in the last twelve years, almost have doubled in number.7 ELD
students are able to speak either limited English or no English at all, 8
yet typically are required by state law to attend school.9
3. Responding to the needs of a student who lacked the use of her hands, a high school in
the Washington, D.C. area purchased a $10,000 laptop computer outfitted with a microphone
and voice recognition software. See Robert O'Harrow Jr., Technology Meets Some Special
Needs; Devices, Software Help Disabled Students Overcome Obstacles to Learning, WASH.
POST, Feb. 9, 1997, at B1.
4. For example, in the Grand Blanc Community School District near Flint, Michigan, a
federal district court ordered a school to provide a full-time instructional aide for an autistic
child desiring to attend public school instead of a specialized school for the mentally disabled.
See Showkeir v. Grand Blanc Community Sch., No. 91-CV-40357-FL (D. Mich. Sept. 18,
1992) (consent decree and order of dismissal); see also Wendy Wendland, Autistic Girl to
Attend Class in Wake ofLegalAgreement, FLINTJ., Sept. 19, 1992, at Al.
5. For example, in response to the enrollment of a student who had osteogenesis
imperfecta, or "brittle bones" disease, in Michigan's Davison Community Schools, the school
district installed a new elevator at a cost of $100,000. See Interview with R. Clay Perkins,
Assistant Superintendent of Davison Community Schools, in Davison, Mich. (Dec. 21, 1996).
6. Courts and commentators have referred to students with limited or no English
proficiency by various designations, including Limited-English-Proficiency (LEP) students and
Non-English-Speaking (NES) students. See, e.g., ROSEMARY C. SANDSTONE, EQUAL
EDUCATION UNDER LAW 81 (1986). For simplicity, however, this Note will not distinguish
between LED and NES students, and instead will reference as an ELD student any student
whose primary language is not English.
7. See HOWARD L. FLEISCHMAN & PAUL J. HOPSTOCK, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUCATION,
DESCRIPTIVE STUDY OF SERVICES TO LIMITED ENGLISH PROFICIENT STUDENTS 3 (1994)
[hereinafter DESCRIPTIVE STUDY OF SERVICES]. The Department of Education's 1991 survey
found that there were 2,314,079 ELD students attending public schools, an increase of almost
1,000,000 from a similar study in 1984. See id.
8. Some ELD students have been in the United States all of their lives, while others have
just arrived. According to one survey, 33% of ELD students in 1992 were born in the United
States while approximately 20% had been in the United States for less than one year. See
DESCRIPTIVE STUDY OF SERVICES, supra note 7, at 12.
9. All fifty states are required by their constitutions to provide free public education for
children, typically through the age of sixteen. See ALA. CONST. art. XIV, § 256, amended by
ALA. CONST. amend. CXI; ALASKA CONST. art. VII, § I; ARIZ. CONST. art. XI, § 1; ARK.
CONST. art. XIV, § 1; CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 1; COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 2; CONN. CONST. art.
VIII, § 1; DEL. CONST. art. X, § 1; FLA. CONST. art IX, § 1; GA. CoNST. art. VIII, § 1; HAW.
CONST. art. IX, § 1; IDAHO CONST. art. IX, § 1; ILL. CONST. art. X, § 1; IND. CONST. art. VIII, §
1; IOWA CONST. art IX, 2nd, § 3; KAN. CONST. art VI, § 1; KY. CONST. § 183; LA. CONST. art.
VIIL § 1; ME. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; MD. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. 5, § 2;
MICH. CONST. art. VIII, §§ 1, 2; MINN. CONST. art. XIII, § 1; MISS. CONST. art. VIII, §§ 201,
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Most ELD students live in major metropolitan areas near families
that share their native language.' ° Consequently, public schools in
these areas frequently enroll large numbers of ELD students who
speak a common foreign language." These schools often voluntarily
establish language programs for their ELD students.12 However,
many schools cannot provide their ELD students with such programs
because their ELD students are either the only children in their school
who do not speak English, or because their ELD students' primary
language is so unique that they cannot afford to establish a language
program that is appropriate for them.
13
For many ELD students, the inability to speak their school's
mandated 14  language of instruction handicaps their ability to
participate in the learning process. 15 In this respect, ELD students'
205; Mo. CONST. art. IX, § I(a); MONT. CONST. art. X, § 1; NEB. CONST. art. VII, § I; NEV.
CONST. art. IL § 1; N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. LXXXIII; N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 4(l), (2); N.M.
CONST. art. XII, § I; N.Y. CONST. art. X, § 1; N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 2; N.D. CONST. art. VIII,
§§ 1, 2, 4; OHIO CONST. arL VI, § 2; OKLA. CONST. art. XIII, § 1; OR. CONST. art. VIII, § 3;
PA. CONST. art MI, § 14; R.I. CONST. art. XII, § 1; S.C. CONST. art XI, § 3; S.D. CONST. art.
VIII, § 1; TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 12; TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 1; UTAH CONST. art. X, § 1; VT.
CONST. ch. 1, § 68; VA. CONST. art. VII, §§ 1, 2; WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 2; W. VA. CONST.
art. XII, § 1; WIS. CONST. art. X, § 3; WYO. CONST. art. VII, §§ 1, 9.
10. See Sandra James, Foreign Students and Language Demands Soar, HARTFORD
COURANT, Aug. 7, 1995, at A1; see also DESCRIPTIVE STUDY OF SERVICES, supra note 7, at 3.
11. See Susan Headden, Tongue-tied in the Schools, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Sept. 25,
1995, at 45. Almost 33% of school districts located in large cities contain over 100 ELD
students. See DESCRIPTIVE STUDY OF SERVICES, supra note 7, at 7. While only 3% of students
in rural areas participate in a bilingual education or an English-as-a-Second-Language (ESL)
program, over 18% of all students in either a large city or the suburb of a large city are enrolled
in either a bilingual education or an ESL program. See DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS,
supra note 2, at 70.
12. See, e.g., Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974); Sema v. Portales Mun. Schs., 499 F.2d
1147 (10th Cir. 1974).
13. See James, supra note 10, at Al. While most ELD students speak Spanish (73%),
many ELD students speak less common languages such as Armenian (0.5%), Mandarin (0.5%),
Farsi (0.4%), Hindi (0.3%), and Polish (0.3%). See DESCRIPTIVE STUDY OF SERVICES, supra
note 7, at 11.
14. Some states constitutionally or statutorily require that public school teachers speak
only English when teaching all classes other than those of a foreign language. See ARIZ.
CONST. art. XXVIII, § 1; ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-16-104; N.M. CONST. art. XXI, § 4 (Michie
1997).
15. Significant difficulties arise for older ELD students who either have just arrived in the
United States or previously have attended another school where classes were taught in the
students' primary language. See DESCRIPTIVE STUDY OF SERVICES, supra note 7, at 10. While
young children possess a great capacity for learning a new language, children in early
adolescence find learning a new language to be relatively difficult. See JOHN W. SANTROCK,
1998]
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disability is similar to the disabilities of handicapped children who
qualify for protection: ELD students' access to public education is
restricted by something beyond their immediate control.' 6 Despite
this similarity, ELD students' disabilities are not protected under any
of the disability acts. 17 Congress and the judiciary have not ignored
this inconsistent treatment. Over the past twenty-five years, federal
legislation, 8 federal regulations,' 9 and several court decisions2 have
attempted to accommodate ELD students' disability. However, such
attempts have resulted in ambiguous standards for determining which
ELD students are entitled to special assistance and what level of
responsibility must be exercised by public school districts in
accommodating these students. This shortcoming is especially
disturbing in light of the recently reinvigorated debate over making
English the official language of the United States.
21
LIFE-SPAN DEVELOPMENT 178-81 (4th ed. 1992); see also Craig A. Ramsey & E.N. Wright,
Age and Second Language Learning, 94 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 115 (1974) (finding a correlation
between age and language test scores); David S. Palermo & Dennis L. Molfese, Language
Acquisition from Age Five Onward, 78 PSYCHOL. BULL. 409 (1972) (finding that younger
children learn language faster than older children). Consequently, researchers suggest that
simply placing these older ELD students in classrooms where English is the only language
spoken may not be the most effective tool for teaching them. See SANTROCK, supra, at 181.
16. While one may argue that the parents of ELD students have control over whether they
reside in a school district incapable of accommodating their children's needs, the same
argument applies to children with other disabilities recognized by the IDEA. Children
themselves have no control over (1) which language they learn and (2) in which school district
they will enroll. The Supreme Court generally addressed this issue in Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S.
202 (1982). In Plyler, the Court held that states cannot deny public education to school-aged
illegal aliens. See id. at 220. The court reasoned that while parents' illegal entry into the United
States is a voluntary action, their children's entry is not. See id. The Court stressed that children
should not be held responsible for the misguided decisions of their parents. See id.
17. See infra note 33 and accompanying text for a discussion of qualified disabilities
under the IDEA.
18. See Equal Educational Opportunities Act of 1974 (EEOA), 20 U.S.C. § 1703 (1994);
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994).
19. See Identification of Discrimination and Denial of Sevices on the Basis of National
Origin, 34 C.F.R. § 100.1 (1980); 35 Fed. Reg. 11,595 (1970).
20. See, e.g., Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974); Sema v. Portales Mun. Schs., 499 F.2d
1147 (10th Cir. 1974); Otero v. Mesa County Valley Sch. Dist. No. 51, 408 F. Supp. 162 (D.
Colo. 1975).
21. See, e.g., English as Official Language: Hearings on S. 356 Before the Senate Comm.
on Gov't Affairs, available in 1996 WL 7135845 (Mar. 7, 1996) (statement of Sen. Simon);
Note, "Official English ". Federal Limits on Efforts to Curtail Bilingual Services in the States,
100 HARV. L. REv. 1345 (1987); Tony Mauro, English-Only Debate Lost in Legalese, USA
TODAY, Dec. 5, 1996, at 4A. Some debates center on whether existing bilingual education
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol53/iss1/8
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As this Note will demonstrate, the disabilities suffered by ELD
students are substantially similar to the mental and physical
disabilities protected by the Individuals with Disabilities Education
Act (IDEA); yet Congress has guaranteed equal educational access
only to the latter group of students. In response to such disparate
treatment, this Note proposes federal legislation that will equalize the
educational opportunities for ELD students in much the same way
that the IDEA equalized the educational opportunities for physically
and mentally disabled students. To establish a foundation for this
proposal, Part II of this note examines physically and linguistically
challenged students' historical efforts to gain access to equal
educational opportunities. Part III then evaluates the efficacy of ELD
students' present legal avenues for seeking equal educational
opportunities and concludes that an alternative avenue is needed.
Finally, Part IV proposes a model for legislation that will extend to
ELD students the same educational rights enjoyed by physically and
mentally disabled students under the IDEA.
II. PHYSICALLY AND LINGUISTICALLY CHALLENGED STUDENTS'
EFFORTS TO GAIN EQUALITY IN EDUCATION
Until the late 1950s, equality in education was not a national
priority.22 Prior to that time, disadvantaged students who claimed that
schools were providing unequal educational opportunities rarely
raised such challenges in federal court. Only in 1954, in the landmark
case of Brown v. Board of Education,23 did the Supreme Court finally
recognize the importance of equal educational opportunities for all
children. The Brown Court acknowledged the need for equality not
just in the "tangible" factors, such as facilities and supplies, but also
in "those qualities which are incapable of objective measurement." 24
Moreover, the Brown Court reasoned that if a state endeavors to
provide free and compulsory education, the education must be
programs should be abolished altogether. See, e.g., Carlos Munoz, Bilingual Debate Divides
California, DENVER POST, Aug. 17, 1997, at G6.
22. Indeed, the Supreme Court condoned unequal treatment of blacks in Plessy v.
Ferguson. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
23. 347 U.S. 483 (1954),
24. Id. at 493 (citing Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 634 (1950)).
19981
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obtainable by all students of proper age, regardless of their physical
characteristics.25
A. Physically Disabled Students
Twenty years after the Supreme Court's decision in Brown, the
full force of Brown's holding had yet to be realized. Public schools
routinely denied disabled students access to education,26 and courts
routinely rejected the constitutional claims of parents who sought
equal access to education for their disabled children.27 In 1972,
however, the concept of equality in education was finally extended to
include individuals with disabilities. In Pennsylvania Ass'n for
Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania,28 a Pennsylvania district court
proclaimed that "retarded children who heretofore had been excluded
from a public program of education will no longer be so excluded
.... ,29 As a result of this decision, courts became more willing to
extend equal educational rights to disabled students.
30
Three years later, in response to the nearly eight million children
in the United States who were excluded from the most important
benefits of education due to their physical or mental disabilities,
Congress declared that securing an equal educational opportunity for
disabled children is a national interest and passed the Education for
All Handicapped Children Act,31 later amended and renamed the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act.32 By its own terms, the
25. See id. at 493.
26. See M. LOUISE LANTzY, INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT: AN
ANNOTATED GUIDE TO ITS LITERATURE AND RESOURCES, 1980-1991 1-2 (1992).
27. See, e.g., Frederick L. v. Thomas, 408 F. Supp. 832 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Fialkowski v.
Shapp, 405 F. Supp. 946 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Harrison v. Michigan, 350 F. Supp. 846 (E.D. Mich.
1972); Mills v. Board of Educ. of D.C., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972).
28. 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
29. Id. at 302.
30. See, e.g., Panitch v. Wisconsin, 390 F. Supp. 611 (E.D. Wis. 1974) (allowing a
mentally disabled child to proceed in a class action suit to compel a school district to provide
special education services).
31. Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (1975).
32. Education of the Handicapped Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-476,
§ 901(a)(1), 104 Stat. 1103 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1491o (1994)). The
IDEA was spawned in part by the public's concer that disabled children either were totally
excluded from the education process or were simply placed in regular classrooms until they
were old enough to drop out. See Beth v. Carroll, 876 F. Supp. 1415 (E.D. Pa. 1995), revd, 87
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IDEA applies to all disabled children 33 and requires schools to tailor
educational programs to disabled students' particular disabilities.34
While there have been mixed reactions to the IDEA's effectiveness,
the prevailing perception is that the national commitment to
educating all students without regard to disability and the
individualized educational programs established for each disabled
student have secured the same opportunities for disabled children as
those available to other children.35
B. Linguistically Disabled Students
Unfortunately, ELD children have not enjoyed the rights that
physically and mentally disabled children have enjoyed under the
IDEA. This has resulted from the fact that the IDEA does not include
linguistic disabilities within its scope of protected disabilities. By the
late 1960s, this disparate treatment culminated in the genesis of a
movement to compel public school districts to afford ELD students
the same educational opportunities as other disabled students. ELD
students sought such equal educational opportunities under three
F.3d 80 (3d Cir. 1996).
33. The IDEA defines "children with disabilities" as children "(i) with mental retardation,
hearing impairments including deafness, speech or language impairments, visual impairments
including blindness, serious emotional disturbance, orthopedic impairments, autism, traumatic
brain injury, other health impairments, or specific learning disabilities; and (ii) who, by reason
thereof, need special education and related services." 20 U.S.C. § 140 1(a)(1)(A)(i)-(ii).
34. See id. § 1412(2XA)-(C). Under the IDEA, schools must collaborate with disabled
students' parents to devise an individualized education program (IEP). The IEP states what a
disabled student's particular needs are, establishes both short- and long-term goals for educating
the student and assimilating the student into a regular classroom, and requires yearly progress
reports to determine whether the educational procedures established for the student remain
adequately aimed toward reaching the goals set by the IEP. See id. § 1412(2)(A).
35. See, e.g., Wilbur Hawke, The Lone Father: Dad Learns Many New Skills, Especially
Advocacy, EXCEPTIONAL PARENT, Nov. 1, 1996, at 28; Kathleen Hillenmeyer, Educating
Everybody. Inclusion Opens New Worlds, CIN. ENQUIRER, Apr. 15, 1996, at Al; Jennifer
Maddox, Disabled Kids Often Thrive In Regular Classes, ROCKY MT. NEWS, Oct. 14, 1996, at
42A; Suk Tom, Special-Needs Students Are Right At Home Among Neighborhood Friends, DES
MOINES REG., Sept. I1, 1996, at 5. But see Phil Brinkman, The Cost of Accommodating: As
Special Education Grows. So Does the Expense of Staffing, WiS. ST. J., Feb. 10, 1997, at IA;
Dante Chinni, A Bad IDEA, WASH. MONTHLY, May 1, 1996, at 17; Anna Dubrovsky, Dover
Schools' Head Tells Congress ofRising Costs in Special Education, YORK DAILY REC., Feb. 5,
1997, at 5; Lisa Gubernick & Michelle Conlin, The Special Education Scandal, FORBES, Feb.
10, 1997, at66.
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sources of law: the Equal Protection Clause,36 Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964,37 and the Equal Educational Opportunity Act. 8
1. Equal Protection Claims
Most of the early challenges by ELD students asserted that a
school's failure to offer special language assistance amounted to a
denial of equal protection in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment.39 The plaintiffs in Lau v. Nichols40 were the first to
allege such a claim in federal court. In Lau, 2,856 Chinese-speaking
students challenged their school district's policy for handling students
with English language deficiencies on the ground that their school's
special language programs inadequately addressed the needs of ELD
students.4 In addition to asserting state constitutional and statutory
36. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I.
37. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994).
38. 20U.S.C. § 1703 (1994).
39. See, e.g., Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974); Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 521 F.2d
465 (10th Cir. 1975); Sema v. Portales Mun. Schs., 499 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1974); Otero v.
Mesa County Valley Sch. Dist. No. 51,408 F. Supp. 162 (D. Colo. 1975). Most students argued
that the school deprived them of their right to an education by providing English-speaking
students with the facilities needed for a sufficient education and by not providing comparable
facilities for similarly situated non-English-speaking students. See, e.g., Lau, 414 U.S. at 563;
Serna, 499 F.2d at 1147. Some students claimed a specific right to bilingual education, as
opposed to a broader right to an education. See, e.g., Keyes, 521 F.2d at 482; Serna, 499 F.2d at
1149; Otero, 408 F. Supp. at 170-71. In Keyes, the Tenth Circuit held that there is no
Fourteenth Amendment right "to an educational experience tailored to [a student's] unique
cultural and developmental needs." Keyes, 521 F.2d at 482. Furthermore, the court in Otero
declared that, for practical and financial reasons, there is no constitutional right to bilingual or
bicultural education: "[I]f there were an Equal Protection right to bilingualfbicultural education,
the needs of a single student would give rise to that right, and our nation's schools would
bankrupt themselves in meeting Equal Protection claims to bilingual education in every
conceivable language and dialect." Otero, 408 F. Supp. at 169. Many students also have argued
that schools unconstitutionally discriminate against ELD students on the basis of race or
national origin by not offering special assistance to ELD students. See, e.g., United States v.
School Dist. of Ferndale, 577 F.2d 1339 (6th Cir. 1978); Heavy Runner v. Bremner, 522 F.
Supp. 162 (D. Mont. 1981); Martin Luther King, Jr. Elementary Sch. Children v. Michigan Bd.
of Educ., 463 F. Supp. 1027 (E.D. Mich. 1978). The students in Valadez v. Graham, 474 F.
Supp. 149 (M.D. Fla. 1979), asserted both claims.
40. 483 F.2d 791 (9th Cir. 1973), rev'd, 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
41. See id at 792-93. The students maintained that although the school district was
accommodating to a limited degree the needs of some of the students, the school nevertheless
was "abridg[ing] their rights to an education and to bilingual education, and disregard[ing] their
rights to equal educational opportunity among themselves and with English-speaking students."
Id. at 793.
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claims, the students alleged violations of the Equal Protection Clause
and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.42 After the district court
ruled that the school district had not violated the students' equal
protection rights,43 the students contended on appeal that the district
court had based its ruling on a misinterpretation of the Supreme
Court's holding in Brown.4 Specifically, the students claimed that
the school district's policies had the effect of segregating the students
on the basis of national origin-a practice forbidden by Brown-and
that the school was offering facilities that were useful only to non-
minorities.45
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court,
holding that the school district had not violated the Equal Protection
Clause. The court emphasized that under the Supreme Court's
mandate in Brown, a school district is compelled only to offer the
same "facilities, textbooks, teachers and curriculum as is [sic]
provided to other children in the district.' 46 Because the court could
42. See id. at 793.
43. See Lau v. Nichols, No. 70-627 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
44. See Lau, 483 F.2d at 794. The appellants also premised part of their equal protection
claim on the fact that the school district offered part- and full-time bilingual education to some
Chinese students with English-language deficiencies, but did not provide such education to
other students. See id. at 793-94. The Ninth Circuit rejected the claim that this procedure
violated the Equal Protection Clause. The court reasoned that a school district should not only
be free to establish its curriculum without undue interference from the legislature, see id. at 799,
but also should be allowed to develop remedial programs "one step at a time," id. at 800 (citing
Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955)). In support of this notion,
the court pointed to the San Francisco Unified School District, which began its bilingual and
ESL program as a pilot program with just a few students, increasing size and budget allotments
each year. See id.
45. See id. at 794. The students claimed that the Brown Court held that education "is a
right which must be made available to all on equal terms." Id. (citing Brown v. Board of Educ.
of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483,493 (1954)). The students contended that, in other words, schools had
a duty under Brown to provide the same textbooks, facilities, and teachers to all students. See
id. They further argued that, "[I1f [a] student is disadvantaged with respect to his classmates, the
school has an affirmative duty [under Brown] to provide him special assistance to overcome his
disabilities, whatever the origin of those disabilities may be." Id.
46. Id. at 799. The Lau majority explained that the Brown decision declared
unconstitutional only de jure discrimination, not de facto discrimination, see id. at 794, and
cited numerous examples of situations in which courts have found de jure discrimination by
school districts. The majority noted that the "[a]ppellants have neither alleged nor shown any
such [de jure] discriminatory actions" by the school district. See id at 796. The dissent in Lau
argued that there need only be a showing of discriminatory effect. See id. at 803. The dissent
stated that the district's failure to provide equal accessibility to educational resources had a
clear discriminatory effect, an effect which the school district itself admitted in an official
1998l
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find no evidence that the school district did not provide equal
facilities, textbooks, teachers, and curriculum,47 the court held that
the school district was in fact treating its ELD students similarly to its
English-proficient students.48  Although the Supreme Court
subsequently reversed the Ninth Circuit's Lau decision, the Supreme
Court chose not to address the Ninth Circuit's equal protection
analysis.
49
Lau left unclear whether establishing that a school district's
practices had a discriminatory impact on students' educational
opportunities would suffice to prove an equal protection violation.50
publication. See id. at 801-02. The publication stated: .'For [the Chinese-speaking students],
the lack of English means poor performance in school .... The student is almost inevitably
doomed to be a dropout and become another unemployable in the ghetto."' Id. at 801 (quoting
San Francisco Unified School District, Pilot Program: Chinese Bilingual, May 5, 1969, at 3a,
6a, cited in Appellant's Opening Brief at 11, Lau v. Nichols, 483 F.2d 791 (9th Cir. 1993) (No.
26155)).
The Lau court also rejected the students' claim that the court's decision was controlled by
decisions finding de facto discrimination unconstitutional where "states' actions [have]
perpetuated the ill effects of past dejure segregation .... Id. at 796-97. The court found no
connection between the appellants' language deficiencies and any past de jure discrimination
despite an amicus curiae's assertion that the appellants were "members of an identifiable racial
minority which has historically been discriminated against by state action in the area of
education." Id. at 797 (quoting Harvard University Amicus Curiae Brief at 28).
47. Seeidat799.
48. See id. The dissent would have considered the school district's failure to provide
special assistance to the ELD students a prima facie violation of the Equal Protection Clause. In
fact, the dissent stated, "Mhe [school district] withholds from a readily identifiable segment of
an ethnic minority the minimum English language instruction necessary for that segment to
participate in the educational process with any chance of success." Id. at 801. (Hill, C.J.,
dissenting). The dissent argued that when a student cannot speak the only language spoken in
the classroom and written in the textbooks, the student is receiving no educational opportunity,
much less an equal educational opportunity. See id.
49. See Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
50. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg, Disproportionate Impact and Illicit Motive: Theories of
ConstitutionalAdjudication, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 36,39 (1977) ("[T]here is a conflicting mass of
precedent on the proper role of impact in constitutional adjudication."); Theodore Eisenberg &
Shed Lynn Johnson, The Effects of Intent: Do We Know How Legal Standards Work?, 76
CORNELL L. REV. 1151, 1194 (1991) ("Pre-Davis race-based equal protection law was in a state
of confusion. After announcing in several opinions that disparate effects could establish
violations of the equal protection clause, the Court discarded effects and demanded a showing
of illicit motive.'); Eric Buermann, Casenote, Greene v. City of Memphis: Is Intent the Sine
Qua Non of Discrimination Claims?, 35 U. MIAMI L. REV. 131, 136 (1980) (discussing the
Supreme Court's mixed messages regarding the intent requirement); Julie Edwards, Comment,
The Right to Vote and Reapportionment in the Texas Legislature, 41 BAYLOR L. REV. 689, 700
(1989) (noting ambiguity of requirements for proving an equal protection violation).
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Three years later, however, in Washington v. Davis,5' the Supreme
Court held that an equal protection violation would be sustained only
upon a showing that individuals had been subjected to purposeful,
invidious discrimination.52  Consequently, after Davis, courts
consistently rejected equal protection challenges by ELD students on
the grounds that there was no indication that school districts had
intentionally discriminated against a specific class of students based
on race or national origin. 3 However, courts did signal their
willingness to consider discriminatory effects as an element in
determining whether a school district possessed an underlying
discriminatory purpose. 4
Some ELD students asserted that courts should apply a strict-
scrutiny standard of review55 to these claims, arguing that (1)
education is a fundamental right,56 (2) they were being denied such a
fundamental right,57 and (3) such denial was based on classifications
of race or national origin.58 Before the Supreme Court could consider
51. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
52. See id. at 238-39. In other words, if a policy is fair on its face but has the effect of
segregating individuals, the assumption is that the policy is valid. See id. at 241-42. In contrast,
Justice Powell in Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252
(1977), suggested that upon a showing of discriminatory effect, the burden should shift to the
defendant to validate the policy by showing that the same decisions or segregational effect
would have occurred had there not been a discriminatory purpose. See id. at 270.
53. See, e.g., Valadez v. Graham, 474 F. Supp. 149, 156 (M.D. Fla. 1979); Deerfield
Hutterian Ass'n v. Ipswich Bd. of Educ., 468 F. Supp. 1219, 1230-31 (D.S.D. 1979).
Because none of the cases that have asserted a Fourteenth Amendment equal protection
claim have been found to support either a fundamental right or purposeful discrimination, ELD
students' equal protection challenges have been evaluated by courts under the "mere
rationality" test. The court's analysis in Deerfield exemplifies the standard analysis used by
other courts in evaluating ELD students' equal protection claims. The Deerfield court stated
that, "In this case, [the state has a legitimate interest] in providing maximum discretion to
locally autonomous governmental boards... [and] education ... is something which can best
be implemented and administerhd on a local level." Id. at 1231.
54. For example, the court in Valadez held that the systematic application of a policy or
procedure is just one of many considerations that courts may use in determining whether an
alleged incident of discrimination was intentional. See Valadez, 474 F. Supp. at 155.
55. Courts apply a heightened standard of review to governmental regulations that affect a
fundamental right or that make distinctions based on race or national origin. In such situations,
the regulation is valid only if it is necessary to further a compelling governmental interest. See,
e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AmECAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 16-7 to -13, at 1454-65 (2d
ed. 1988).
56. See, e.g., Valadez, 474 F. Supp. at 156.
57. See, e.g., id.
58. See, e.g., Deerfield Hutterian Ass'n v. Ipswich Bd. ofEduc., 468 F. Supp. 1219, 1230
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such a constitutional challenge by ELD students, it preempted the
claim in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez.59 In
Rodriguez, the Court, while admitting the "grave significance of
education both to the individual and to our society," 60 held that there
is neither an explicit nor an implicit guarantee of education in the
Constitution, and that, therefore, there is no guarantee of absolute
equality in education.6' The Court did suggest, however, that a
complete deprivation of education might violate an individual's
fundamental rights.62
(D.S.D. 1979).
59. 411 U.S. 1 (1973). In Rodriguez, the Court considered a challenge to Texas's system
of financing public education. See id. Parents who lived in areas with a low tax base argued that
the disparate expenditures per pupil among different school districts that resulted from Texas's
reliance upon property taxes to fund the schools amounted to a deprivation of equal educational
opportunity. See id. at 17-18. The plaintiffs further argued that education is a fundamental right
because it is necessary for the exercise of explicit constitutional rights, such as the right of free
speech: "ITihe right to speak is meaningless unless the speaker is capable of articulating his
thoughts intelligently .... Id. at 35.
60. Id. at 30 (quoting San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 337 F. Supp 280, 283
(V.D. Tex. 1971)).
61. See id. at 35.
62. See id. at 36-37 ("Even if it were conceded that some identifiable quantum of
education is a constitutionally protected [right] .... we have no indication that the present levels
of educational expenditures in Texas provide an education that falls short.") Because the
Rodriguez Court found that education is not a fundamental right, the school financing system
only needed to be rationally related to a legitimate state interest. See id. at 40.
Almost ten years after the Court decided Rodriguez, the Court gave further validity to the
argument that all students have a right to some minimal amount of education. In Plyler v. Doe,
457 U.S. 202 (1982), the Court deemed unconstitutional a Texas statute that denied state funds
to public school districts enrolling illegal alien children. See id. at 205. The Court held that
withholding funds for the education of illegal-alien children is a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause. See id. at 220-22. Although the Court in Plyler did not go so far as to hold
that the complete denial of education would violate a fundamental right, it did find that
education is more than just a social welfare benefit and determined that the cost to our nation
would be "significant" if groups of individuals were denied education:
[E]ducation has a fundamental role in maintaining the fabric of our society.... [The]
denial of education to some isolated group of children poses an affront to one of the
goals of the Equal Protection Clause: the abolition of govemmental barriers presenting
unreasonable obstacles to advancement on the basis of individual merit.
Id. at 221-22. However, it is unclear whether students who cannot speak any English actually
are deprived completely of an education, thereby invoking a strict scrutiny review. In a
concurring opinion in Plyler, Justice Blackmun argued that the complete denial of education is
similar to the complete denial of the right to vote in that both place undue disadvantages on the
individual. See id. at 234. Moreover, he asserted that "when the State provides an education to
some and denies it to others, it immediately and inevitably creates class distinctions of a type
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The Rodriguez Court's suggestion that a complete deprivation of
education might violate an individual's fundamental rights enabled
ELD students to articulate an alternate basis for their constitutional
claim to special language assistance: ELD students' inability to
understand the language of their teachers completely deprives them
of education. However, to date, no ELD student has successfully
litigated an equal protection claim based on complete deprivation of
education. Perhaps due to the rigorous legal standards that ELD
students must meet for a court to find a school in violation of the
Equal Protection Clause, recent ELD discrimination suits have not
alleged equal protection violations.63 Instead, such discrimination
suits have been based on one of two federal anti-discrimination
statutes. 64 Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,65 the broader of
the two statutes, has been the primary focus of most of the ELD
litigation since Lau.
2. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 conditions public
institutions' receipt of federal funds on their agreement not to
discriminate on the basis of race, color, or national origin.66 Almost
fundamentally inconsistent with [equal protection]." Id.
63. See, e.g., Teresa P. v. Berkeley Unified Sch. Dist., 724 F. Supp. 698 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
64. See, e.g., Heavy Runner v. Bremner, 522 F. Supp. 162 (D. Mont. 1981).
65. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994).
66. See id. Section 2000d states:
No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.
let Title VI also requires the individual federal funding agencies to promulgate rules to enforce
Title VI. See id. § 2000d-1. Section 2000d-I provides:
Each federal department and agency which is empowered to extend Federal financial
assistance to any program or activity... is authorized and directed to effectuate the
provisions of [§ 2000d] with respect to such program or activity by issuing rules,
regulations, or orders of general applicability which shall be consistent with
achievement of the objectives of the statute authorizing the financial assistance in
connection with which the action is taken.
Id. Both the Department of Education and the Department of Health and Human Services have
enacted guidelines that specifically apply Title VI's standards to schools that receive federal
funds. See Office for Civil Rights Regulation, 34 C.F.R. § 100.3(b)(2) (1996) (forbidding
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from the time of its enactment, ELD students have used Title VI as a
vehicle for asserting their entitlement to an equal educational
opportunity. Generally, ELD students have focused their arguments
on their public schools' alleged neglect of the unique needs of foreign
students, as manifested by their schools' inattention to language
barriers.
67
In order to prove a Title VI claim, a party must demonstrate that
the federally funded program in question maintains a practice of
discriminating on the basis of race, color, or national origin.68 It
remains unclear, however, exactly how many individuals must be
affected by the discriminatory practice to sustain a violation of Title
VI. Moreover, it is not clear whether a party must prove intent to
discriminate on the part of a Title VI defendant.
a. Requisite Number of Affected Students: Blackmun's Warning
In Lau v. Nichols,69 the Supreme Court refused to consider the
equal protection claim of the 2,800 Chinese ELD students enrolled in
the San Francisco Unified School District and instead based its
decision solely on the students' Title VI claim. 70 Applying the federal
regulations implementing Title V171 to the facts in Lau, and invoking
discrimination having "the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination because of their
race, color, or national origin, or [having] the effect of defeating or substantially impairing
accomplishment of the objectives of the program" (emphasis added)); Department of Health
and Human Services Regulation, 45 C.F.R. § 80.3(b)(2) (1996) (same).
67. See Karen McBeth Chopra, Comment, A Forgotten Minority, An American
Perspective: Historical and Current Discrimination Against Asians from the Indian
Subcontinent, 1995 DET. C.L. REV. 1269, 1308 (1995) (discussing the relationship between
English-language deficiency and national origin); Sonja Diaz-Granados, Note, How Can We
Take Away A Right That We Never Protected: Public Education and Immigrant Children, 9
GEO. IMMImR. Li. 827, 851 (1995) ("Failure to provide special programs to overcome the
language barriers faced by LEP children has the effect of denying these immigrant children the
level of quality education being provided their American-born contemporaries."); Cecilia
Wong, Note, Language is Speech: The Illegitimacy of Official English .Ater Yniguez v.
Arizonans For Official English, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 277, 306 (1996) (noting the functional
correlation between language and national origin).
68. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d.
69. 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
70. See id at 566. Because the San Francisco Unified School District received federal
funds, the Court held that the District was obligated to abide by the directives promulgated by
the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) in Title VI regulations. See id.
71. In Title VI's application guidelines, HEW required federally funded school districts to
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the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit's dissenting opinion,72 the Court
held that the disparity in educational opportunities between English-
speaking and Chinese-speaking students was discriminatory under
Title VI. 73 As a result, Lau set a clear precedent for school districts
like the San Francisco Unified School District: When a school
contains a large number of ELD students, Title VI requires that the
school provide special educational assistance to those students. Lau
did not set such a clear precedent, however, for smaller school
districts. Emphasizing that the group of students seeking relief in Lau
was very large, and fearing that the majority's decision might be
interpreted too broadly, Justice Blackmun74 cautioned in his
concurring opinion:
[I]n another case, [if] we are concerned with a very few
youngsters, or with just a single child who speaks only German
or Polish or Spanish or any language other than English, I
would not regard today's decision, or the separate concurrence,
as conclusive upon the issue whether the statute and the
guidelines require the funded school district to provide special
instruction. For me, numbers are at the heart of this case."
Courts, echoing Justice Blackmun's concern, have pointed out that if
Title VI required bilingual education in all circumstances, schools
would bankrupt themselves in trying to meet the needs of every
language represented in the school.76 Thus, as a result of the holding
in Lau, the text of Title VI, and Justice Blackmun's discomfort with
the possible implications of the Lau decision, courts and school
districts have been left with the responsibility of determining whether
"take affirmative steps to rectify the language deficiency in order to open [their] instructional
program[s]" to students who are English-language deficient. See Identification of
Discrimination and Denial of Services on the Basis of Natural Origin, 35 Fed. Reg. 11,595
(1970).
72. See supra notes 46-48.
73. See Lau, 414 U.S. at 568. Pursuant to its holding, the Lau Court ordered the Board of
Education to consider two possible remedies to its discrimination: (1) implementing special
classes in which English would be taught to children of Chinese ancestry, and (2) implementing
special classes in which subjects would be taught in Chinese. See id. at 565.
74. Chief Justice Burgerjoined in Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion. See id. at 571.
75. See id at 572 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
76. See, e.g., Otero v. Mesa County Valley Sch. Dist. No. 51, 408 F. Supp. 162 (D. Colo.
1975).
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Title VI and Lau implicitly require that a school district enroll a
minimum number of students before a court may find a Title VI
violation.77
77. The first case invoking Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion in Lau was Serna v.
Portales Municipal Schools. 499 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1974). The facts in Serna were similar to
those in Lau: a considerable number of students in the Portales Municipal School District spoke
little or no English, and the District had not instituted a satisfactory program to assist its ELD
students. See id at 1149. After finding the Portales School District in violation of Title VI, the
Serna court expressed concern that future courts would construe its holding to require bilingual
education for even a single ELD student. See id at 1154. The Serna court cautioned, "[a]s Mr.
Justice Blackmun pointed out in his concurring opinion in Lau, numbers are at the heart of this
case and only when a substantial group is being deprived of a meaningful education will a Title
VI violation exist." Id.
Serna's adoption of Justice Blackmun's "numbers approach" paved the way for school
districts with only one or a few ELD students to be exempt from instituting special language or
curricular programs. To date, federal courts generally have followed Justice Blackmun's
recommendation in Lau and the reasoning of the Serna court in finding a Title VI violation only
when there exists a substantial number of ELD students in a given school district. See, e.g.,
Lloyd v. Regional Transp. Auth., 548 F.2d 1277, 1284 (7th Cir. 1977) (holding that a potential
class of hundreds of thousands of physically disabled citizens satisfies Justice Blackmun's
caveat of finding a Title VI violation only when the interests ofa substantial number of students
are involved); Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 521 F.2d 465, 483 (10th Cir. 1975) (holding that
despite having similar facts, neither Lau nor Serna controlled because both of those cases
involved large numbers of students); Phelps v. Washburn Univ., 632 F. Supp. 455, 459-60 (D.
Kan. 1986) (holding that "only when a substantial group is being deprived of a meaningful
education will a Title VI violation exist"); Valadez v. Graham, 474 F. Supp. 149, 160 (M.D.
Fla. 1979) (stating in dictum that because a Tite VI violation requires a substantial number of
affected students, and because the number of students affected "does not even approach [the
number of] disadvantaged students" in Lau or Serna, plaintiff's claim would have been denied);
Pabon v. Levine, 70 F.R.D. 674 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (denying defendant's motion for summary
judgment because a Title VI violation required a substantial number of victims, which plaintiff
could prove at trial); Otero v. Mesa County Valley Sch. Dist. No. 51,408 F. Supp. 162, 170-72
(D. Colo. 1975) (finding no violation of Title VI where there were "very few" ELD students).
Only one court has refused to adopt Justice Blackmun's warning in Lau, holding instead that
Title VI requires special educational assistance for ELD students regardless of the number of
affected students. See Heavy Runner v. Bremner, 522 F. Supp. 162, 164 (D. Mont. 1981). The
Heavy Runner court relied on United States v. School District ofFerndale, 577 F.2d 1339, 1345
(6th Cir. 1978), and Deerfield Hutterian Ass'n v. Ipswich Board of Education, 468 F. Supp.
1219 (D.S.D. 1979), in reaching its conclusion that the presence of one ELD student will suffice
to establish a Title VI claim, see Heavy Runner, 522 F. Supp. at 164-65, even though the courts
in Ferndale and Deerfield relied not on Title VI, but, rather, on EEOA section 1703. See
Ferndale, 577 F.2d at 1345; Deerfield, 468 F. Supp. at 1231.
Although no court has attempted to demarcate the point at which the number of ELD
students in any district becomes "substantial," courts have made such determinations on a case-
by-case basis according to the proportion of ELD students in a given school. See Lau v.
Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974) (finding a violation when 2,800 students were involved); Sema v.
Portales Mun. Schs., 499 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1974) (finding a violation when over 100
students were involved); Phelps v. Washburn Univ., 632 F. Supp. 455 (D. Kan. 1986) (finding
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b. Discriminatory Intent vs. Discriminatory Effect
Establishing that a sufficient number of ELD students has suffered
discrimination is only part of the struggle courts have had when
interpreting Title VI. Courts also have had to address the issue of
whether a Title VI violation requires proof of intent to discriminate,
or whether a mere discriminatory effect will suffice. In 1974, the
Supreme Court in Lau stated that a procedure or policy violates Title
VI if it has a discriminatory effect on members of a particular race,
color, or national origin.78  However, subsequent Supreme Court
decisions seem to have altered this interpretation of Title V179 and, as
a result, have caused confusion for some courts. 80
In 1978, a plurality of the Court in Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke8" held that Title VI was coextensive with the
Fourteenth Amendment and, thus, carries an intent requirement. 82 A
year later, in Board of Education v. Harris,83 three dissenting justices
questioned the validity of the Lau Court's holding that a
discriminatory effect would suffice for the purpose of establishing a
Title VI violation.84 Finally, in Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Service
no violation where few students were involved); Valadez v. Graham, 474 F. Supp. 149 (M.D.
Fla. 1979) (finding no violation when 35 students were involved); Otero v. Mesa County Valley
Sch. Dist. No. 51, 408 F. Supp. 162, 171 (D. Colo. 1975) (finding no violation when "few, if
any, students" were involved).
78. See Lau, 414 U.S. at 568 ("Discrimination is barred which has that effect even though
no purposeful design is present.").
79. See Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm., 463 U.S. 582 (1983); Board of Educ. v.
Harris, 444 U.S. 130 (1979); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
80. See, e.g., Larry P. v. Riles, 793 F.2d 969, 981 n.7 (9th Cir. 1984) (outlining the
Supreme Court's conflicting holdings in cases since Lau); Graham v. Tennessee Secondary
Sch. Athletic Ass'n, No. 1:95-CU-044, 1995 WL 115890, at *12 (E.D. Tenn. Feb. 20, 1995)
(noting that the Supreme Court "has not been entirely clear as to whether Title VI requires
proof of' discriminatory intent or merely of discriminatory effect); Association of Mexican-
American Educators v. California, 836 F. Supp. 1534, 1545 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (indicating that
the Court's decisions regarding Title VI claims have not been "clear-cut").
81. 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (Powell, J., plurality opinion) (Brennan, White, Marshall, and
Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
82. See id. at 287.
83. 444 U.S. 130 (1979).
84. See id. at 159-60 (Stewart, Powell, Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting) ("[Title Vi] has been
construed to contain not a mere disparate-impact standard, but a standard of intentional
discrimination.").
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Commission,8 5 the Court settled the conflict by holding that even
though Title VI forbids only intentional discrimination, plaintiffs may
seek relief against actions that have discriminatory effects by
bringing suits based on federal regulations implementing Title VI.
6
Thus, while a school will not violate Title VI by merely maintaining
a policy that has discriminatory effects on one of Title VI's protected
classes, it can still be liable for redressing such effects under
regulations promulgated by federal agencies.
8 7
C. The Equal Educational Opportunity Act
In 1974, Congress enacted the Equal Educational Opportunity
Act88 (EEOA) to prohibit states from denying students an equal
educational experience on the basis of race, color, sex, or national
origin.8 9 The EEOA specifies six actions that constitute unlawful
discrimination.90 The last of these, 20 U.S.C. § 1703(f), directly
85. 463 U.S. 582 (1983).
86. See id, at 610-12; see also Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 292-93 (1985). While
the Court in Guardians did not expressly overrule Lau, some courts have speculated that the
Supreme Court would decide Lau differently today in light of Guardians. See, e.g., Castaneda
v. Pickard, 648 F.2d 989, 1007 (5th Cir. 1981) ("We must confess to serious doubts.., about
the continuing vitality of the rationale of the Supreme Court's opinion in Lau v. Nichols ....");
Bryan v. Koch, 492 F. Supp. 212, 230 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) ("[T]he [Supreme Court's] opinions in
[Regents v. Bakke] and [Board of Education v. Harris] strongly indicate that, were the issue
squarely presented today, a majority of the Justices would hold that Lau no longer controls
87. ELD students asserting claims based on Title VI regulations may not be able to prove
that a school's practices either intentionally or unintentionally discriminate on the basis of race
or national origin when there are only a few ELD students in the school district. In these cases,
the aggrieved students must show that the school's practices do in fact discriminate on the basis
of race or national origin by relying on the number of aggrieved students.
88. Equal Education Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 93-380, 88 Stat. 514 (1974) (codified
as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1721 (1994)).
89. See 20 U.S.C. § 1703.
90. See id. § 1703(a)-(f). The EEOA proscribes the denial of equal educational
opportunities to an individual on the basis of the individual's race, color, sex, or national origin
by: (1) the deliberate segregation of students by an educational agency, see id. § 1703(a); (2) an
educational agency's failure to take affirmative steps to counter the effects of a previously
segregated school system, see id. § 1703(b); (3) the assignment of a student to a school other
than the one closest to the student's home if such assignment perpetuates a segregating effect,
see id. § 1703(c); (4) the discrimination of an educational agency in employment practices, see
id. § 1703(d); (5) the transfer of a student from one school to another if the purpose or effect of
the transfer is to segregate students, see id. § 1703(e); and (6) the failure of an educational
agency to take affirmative steps to overcome language barriers, see id. § 1703(f).
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relates to the claims of ELD students.9' Unfortunately, § 1703(f) was
added as a floor amendment late in the legislative process of enacting
the EEOA, so little is known about Congress's impetus for enacting
§ 1703(f). As a result, courts have had to rely almost exclusively on
case law interpreting and applying § 1703(f) when evaluating their
own § 1703(f) claims. 92 While these interpretations are useful in
determining general violations of § 1703(f), it is still unclear whether
the statute requires a showing of intentional discrimination and
exactly how many ELD students must be the subject of
discrimination for their to be a statutory violation.
1. Requisite Number of Affected Students
Unlike Title VI litigation, § 1703(f) litigation has been sparse.
Consequently, it is too early to determine whether courts will
interpret § 1703(f) consistent with Title VI's apparent requirement
that a significant number of students have suffered discrimination. In
fact, only two cases have addressed directly the issue of how many
students must have suffered discrimination for a court to find a
§ 1703(f) violation.93 The courts in United States v. School District of
Ferndale94 and Heavy Runner v. Bremner95 held that a § 1703(f)
violation may exist even if only one individual has suffered from
discrimination." In reaching its decision, the Ferndale court relied on
its conclusion that Congress must have intended a broad reading of
the statute.97 Noting that the Attorney General has the authority under
91. At least one court has speculated that the Supreme Court's decision in Lau inspired
§ 1703(0's inclusion in the EEOA. See Cintron v. Brentwood Union Free Sch. Dist., 455 F.
Supp. 57, 61 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
92. One such decision was Martin Luther King, Jr. Elementary Sch. Children v. Michigan
Bd. of Educ., 451 F. Supp. 1324 (E.D. Mich. 1978), which held that to establish a violation of
§ 1703(f), a plaintiff must show (I) that there has been a denial of an educational opportunity
based on race, color, sex, or national origin and (2) that the school failed to take appropriate
action to overcome language barriers that are sufficiently severe so as to impede the student's
equal participation in instructional programs. See id. at 1332.
93. See United States v. School Dist. of Ferndale, 577 F.2d 1339, 1345 (6th Cir. 1978);
Heavy Runner v. Bremner, 522 F. Supp. 162, 164-65 (D. Mont. 1981).
94. 577 F.2d 1339 (6th Cir. 1978).
95. 522 F. Supp. 162 (D. Mont. 1981).
96. See Ferndale, 577 F.2d at 1345; Bremner, 522 F. Supp. at 164-65.
97. See Ferndale, 577 F.2d at 1345.
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the EEOA to institute an action on behalf of an individual who is
denied equal educational opportunity9" and that nothing in the EEOA
requires the Attorney General to identify every potential member of
the discriminated class, the court reasoned that a violation of the
statute may exist even if there has been only one victim of
discrimination.99
2. Discriminatory Intent vs. Discriminatory Effect
As in the Title VI and Fourteenth Amendment cases, few courts
have considered whether § 1703(f) requires a showing of intentional
discrimination for a statutory violation. However, all courts that have
considered the argument that § 1703(f) is just a restatement of the
principles of the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VI, and that it,
thus, includes an intent requirement, have rejected this argument.
These courts instead have held that § 1703(f) creates rights beyond
those protected by the Constitution or Title VI. 1°° In Castaneda v.
Pickard,'01 for example, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that
while Congress intended most of the provisions in § 1703 to require
discriminatory intent, the language of § 1703(f) distinguishes this
subsection from the rest of § 1703 and indicates Congress's intent to
impose only a discriminatory effect standard.102 For example, the
court noted that while § 1703(a) makes several references to
intentional acts, 103  § 1703(f) "does not contain language that
98. See id. A § 1703 claim may be brought either by the aggrieved individual or by the
attorney general on behalf of the individual. See id. § 1706.
99. See Ferndale, 577 F.2d at 1345. ("[The EEOA] does not require identification of all
actual or potential victims of [equal opportunity] denials."). But cf Otera v. Mesa County
Valley Sch. Dist. No. 51,408 F. Supp. 162, 171-72 (D. Colo. 1975) (suggesting that a § 1703(0
violation requires a significant number of ELD students as in Title VI cases).
100. See, eg, United States v. Hinds County Sch. Bd., 560 F.2d 619, 624 (5th Cir. 1997)
(holding that the EEOA "guarantee[s] additional rights to public school children" beyond the
Constitution and previous statutes); United States v. Texas, 506 F. Supp. 405, 432 (E.D. Tex.
1981) ("The evolution of the E.E.O.A. makes it clear that the statute was intended to create new
substantive rights for victims of discrimination, beyond that subject to challenge on
constitutional grounds."), rev'd, 680 F.2d 356 (5th Cir. 1982); Martin Luther King, Jr.
Elementary Sch. Children v. Michigan Bd. of Educ., 463 F. Supp. 1027, 1032 (E.D. Mich.
1978).
101. 648 F.2d 989 (5th Cir. Unit A June 1981).
102. Seeid. at I000-01.
103. See id. For example, § 1703(a) forbids '"deliberate segregation ... on the basis of
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explicitly incorporates an intent requirement nor ... does this
subsection employ words such as 'discrimination' whose legal
definition has been understood to incorporate an intent
requirement."'14
Although there have been few judicial interpretations of the
requirements of § 1703(f), the courts that have considered the scope
of § 1703(f) have consistently given it a broader interpretation than
that given to Title VI and the Fourteenth Amendment.105 Whereas
courts have interpreted Title VI to require a showing of intentional
discrimination against a large number of individuals,'0 6 they have
interpreted § 1703(f) to require merely a showing of discriminatory
effect on a single individual.
race, color, or national origin ... ' and § 1703(e) bars transfers of students which have the
'purpose and effect' of increasing segregation." Id. at 1001 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1703(a), (e)).
104. Id at 1007-08; see also Texas, 506 F. Supp. at 432 ("The question of whether or not
discriminatory intent is a necessary element of a § 1703(f) violation must... be resolved, not
by reference to constitutional doctrine, but by the text of the statute itself."). Congress's goal in
enacting § 1703(0 was "to provide school and governmental authorities with a clear delineation
of their responsibilities to their students and employees and to provide the students and
employees with the means to achieve enforcement of their rights." HOUSE COMM. ON
EDUCATION AND LABOR, H.R. REP. No. 92-1335, at 3 (1972). The proposal for the EEOA came
from President Nixon in 1972 and specifically outlined the creation of enforceable rights for
EL) students:
School authorities must take appropriate action to overcome whatever language
barriers might exist, in order to enable all students to participate equally in educational
programs. This would establish, in effect, an educational bill of rights for Mexican-
Americans, Puerto Ricans, Indians and others who start under language handicaps, and
ensure at last that they too would have equal opportunity.
118 CONG. REC. 8931 (1972) (statement of President Nixon).
Indeed, the legislative history of the EEOA supports Castaneda's holding and indicates
that Congress intended for § 1703(f) to embody both an intent requirement and an additional set
of rights for students.
105. See, e.g., Castaneda v. Pickard, 648 F.2d 989, 1007-08 (5th Cir. Unit A 1981); United
States v. School Dist. of Feradale, 577 F.2d 1339, 1345 (6th Cir. 1978); Heavy Runner v.
Bremner, 522 F. Supp. 162, 164-65 (D. Mont. 1981).
106. See supra notes 69-77 and accompanying text.
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Ill. AN EVALUATION OF THE PRESENT ALTERNATIVES FOR PURSUING
THE EDUCATIONAL RIGHTS OF ELD STUDENTS
A. The Inadequacy of the Present Alternatives
Courts, Congress, and commentators agree that the education of
ELD students is an important and worthwhile objective. 10 7 Despite
their agreement on this point, they have failed to advance clear,
consistent directives as to the means by which ELD student can
secure access to an education that effectively accounts for their
disability. Specifically, the judiciary has applied inconsistent
standards for determining the number of ELD students that must be
enrolled in a particular school before the school may be found in
violation of Title VI or the EEOA. 10 8 Moreover, while Congress has
enacted legislation that requires schools to help ELD students
overcome their language barriers, it nonetheless has failed to
articulate the statutes' coverage. 0 9 Finally, neither the courts nor
Congress have established standardized procedures to guide schools
on how to overcome these language barriers.
1. Inconsistent Judicial Standards
Beginning with Lau v. Nichols,"0 courts have consistently
required that schools with large numbers of ELD students provide
special language assistance to those students."' However, courts have
107. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. §§ 1703, 7402; Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974); Sema v.
Portales Mun. Schs., 351 F. Supp. 1279 (D.N.M. 1972); Rachel F. Moran, Bilingual Education
as a Status Conflict, 75 CAL. L. REV. 321 (1987); Rachel F. Moran, Foreword-The Lessons of
Keyes: How Do You Translate "The American Dream "?, 1 LA RAZA L.J. 195 (1986); Note,
"Official English ": Federal Limits on Efforts to Curtail Bilingual Services in the United States,
100 HARV. L. REV. 1345 (1987); Let DPS Do Its Job, DENVER POST, Aug. 12, 1997, at B6;
Rising Up Against Bilingual Education, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 11, 1997, at A16.
108. See supra notes 66-106 and accompanying text
109. See supra notes 66-106 and accompanying text. Specifically, the statutes do not
specify whether they cover ELD students individually or only in groups.
110. 414U.S. 563 (1974).
111. See, e.g., Castaneda v. Pickard, 648 F.2d 989 (5th. Cir. Unit A June 1981) (over 1000
students); Guadalupe Org. Inc. v. Tempe Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 3, 587 F.2d 1022 (9th. Cir.
1978) (over 1000 students); Morales v. Shannon, 516 F.2d 411 (5th. Cir. 1975) (over 100
students); Sema v. Portales Mun. Schs., 499 F.2d 1147 (10th. Cir. 1974) (over 100 students);
Rios v. Read, 480 F. Supp. 14, 17 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (186 students); Cintron v. Brentwood Union
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been reluctant to require special language assistance in schools that
have few ELD students. Courts' disparate treatment of these two
groups does not appear to stem from a notion that ELD students in
large groups are more disadvantaged than those in small groups.
Rather, the source of this disparity appears to be courts' recognition
of the administrative difficulties of providing special assistance to
small groups of ELD students." 2 Courts seem to have taken Justice
Blackmun's concurring opinion in Lau as a justification for engaging
in a cost-benefit analysis in order to address only the most significant
population of ELD students. Thus, in effect, courts have adopted a
rule requiring only those schools with the greatest number of ELD
students to assist ELD students.
2. Inadequate Sources of Legal Protection
Because courts have ruled that a Title VI violation requires the
presence of a large number of ELD students within a given school
district,"3 and because of the uncertainty of a similar requirement for
a § 1703 violation, the Fourteenth Amendment is presently the best
source of law on which small groups of ELD students might base a
claim for more appropriate educational conditions. The courts that
Free Sch. Dist., 455 F. Supp. 57, 59 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (460 students); Armstrong v. O'Connell,
74 F.R.D. 429,430 (E.D. Wis. 1977) (5% of entire Milwaukee school system).
112. See, e.g., Otero v. Mesa County Valley Sch. Dist. No. 51,408 F. Supp. 162 (D. Colo.
1975). The Otero court partly based its decision that there is no right to bilingual education on
Its concern over the financial effect that such a right would have on schools:
[A]s I have said on occasion in the course of hearings in this case, if there were an
Equal Protection right to bilingual/bicultural education, the needs of a single student
would give rise to that right, and our nation's schools would bankrupt themselves in
meeting Equal Protection claims to bilingual educations in every conceivable language
and dialect.
Id. at 169.
113. See, e.g., Lloyd v. Regional Transp. Auth., 548 F.2d 1277, 1280 n.13 (7th Cir. 1977)
(noting "perceived importance in the number of discriminatees seeking relief"); Serna, 499 F.2d
at 1154 (adopting Justice Blackmun's concurrence in Lau); Phelps v. Washburn Univ., 632 F.
Supp. 455, 460 (D. Kan. 1986) (adopting Serna's requirement of substantial numbers); Valadez
v. Graham, 474 F. Supp. 149, 159 (M.D. Fla. 1979) (adopting Serna's requirement of
substantial numbers); Pabon v. Levine, 70 F.RD. 674, 677 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (same); Otero, 408
F. Supp. at 171 (adopting Justice Blackmun's concurrence in Lau). For a discussion of courts
that have required many students for a finding of a Title VI violation, see supra notes 69-77 and
accompanying text.
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have rejected students' equal protection challenges to the suitability
of their access to education have done so on the grounds that
education is not a fundamental right unless a student is being
completely deprived of an education.'1 4 Thus, it appears that courts
might grant relief under the Fourteenth Amendment to the individual
or small numbers of ELD students who, in fact, typically are
completely denied any meaningful educational opportunity.
The individual ELD students or ELD students in small groups
who are most often completely denied access to a meaningful
educational opportunity typically attend small schools"15 in rural
areas or speak obscure languages 16 not common to the community.
At best, these students receive an independent education in which
they are removed from the classroom to work alone without the
instruction of a teacher or aide."17 More typically though, these ELD
students receive a "total immersion" education, in which they attend
class but understand nothing that their teachers say." 8 In both of
these situations, the students persuasively could claim that they
receive no meaningful instruction at all. Single and small-group ELD
students whose educational experiences mirror those described above
would seem to have endured the educational conditions that the
Supreme Court in San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez"19 addressed when it suggested that there may be a
114. See, e.g., Guadalupe Org. v. Tempe Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 3,587 F.2d 1022, 1026
(9th Cir. 1978); Deerfield Hutterian Ass'n v. Ipswhich Bd. of Educ., 468 F. Supp. 1219, 1230
(D.S.D. 1979); Otero, 408 F. Supp. at 169-70. The students in these cases were still involved in
the educational process, such as those in Deerfield, 468 F. Supp. at 1221, 1226, and some were
even benefiting from a bilingual education program, such as those in Otero, 408 F. Supp. at
169-70.
115. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. Most ELD students attend school in large
groups. The rest are spread throughout the country in small groups. See id.
116. The range of languages spoken by ELD students is diverse. While Spanish is spoken
by 73% of all ELD students, no other language is represented by more than 4% of ELD
students, with most languages represented by only 1% of ELD students. See DESCRIPTIVE
STUDY OF SERVICES, supra note 7, at 11.
117. See interview with Richard Buell, superintendent of Kearsley Community Schools, in
Flint, Mich. (Dec. 21, 1996).
118. One writer has likened this practice to "throw[ing] these kids into the swimming pool
before they've learned to swim." Carlos Munoz, Bilingual Debate Divides California, DENVER
POST, Aug. 17, 1997, at G6.
119. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
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fundamental right to at least "some quantum" of education. 120
Accordingly, a court faced with a challenge by such ELD students
alleging a complete educational deprivation may be inclined to find
that the student was being denied a fundamental right, and, therefore,
that the school's failure to provide a minimal education could be
sustained only if it was necessary to accomplish a compelling
interest.
Indeed, if courts apply the dicta in Rodriguez and find that a
fundamental right is being violated when a student effectively is
receiving no education, all ELD students will have the potential to be
guaranteed an equal educational opportunity. Thus, access to equal
education would not be limited to those ELD students who happen to
attend school with other ELD students or who speak common foreign
languages. However, this guarantee requires that schools be advised
of effective measures by which they can provide ELD students with a
minimally acceptable education. Such effective measures heretofore
have not been advanced by Title VI, the EEOA, the regulations
implementing these statutes, or any court decision requiring schools
to provide special language assistance. The absence of such a clear
mandate has frustrated many schools that have attempted to
implement language assistance programs. 121 Therefore, a national
120. Seeid. at36-37.
121. See interview with Richard M. Buell, Superintendent of Kearsley Community
Schools, in Flint, Mich. (Dec. 21, 1996); Interview with R. Clay Perkins, Assistant
Superintendent of Davison Community Schools, in Davison, Mich. (Dec. 21, 1996).
Many school districts, particularly those with small numbers of ELD students, simply
refuse to offer any assistance program either because school administrators are unsure of what
types of programs to offer or because the programs they have considered were cost prohibitive.
For most schools, qualifying for federal assistance through the Bilingual Education Act, 20
U.S.C. §§ 7402-7491 (1994), can help to resolve the cost-related issues associated with meeting
the needs of ELD students. See infra note 183. However, even when schools can afford to offer
language programs, such programs often are so varied in content that there is no way for courts
to establish a standard by which to measure efficacy. See, e.g., Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563,
564 (1974) (involving a comprehensive bilingual program for two thousand students); Otero v.
Mesa County Valley Sch. Dist. No. 51, 408 F. Supp. 162, 163-67 (D. Colo. 1975) (involving a
remedial language program, but not bilingual education). This results in a system of ELD
assistance that many believe is ineffective. See, e.g., Linda Chavez, Is Bilingual Education
Failing to Help America's Schoolchildren?, INSIGHT MAGAZINE, June 3, 1996, at 24; Margot
Homblower, Putting Tongues in Check, TIME, Oct. 9, 1995, at 40; John Iwasaki & Gordy Holt,
Schools Chief Candidate Says Spanish Is For Menial Laborers, SEATrLE POST-INT., June 27,
1996, at Al; Ana Menendez, Judgment Dayfor Bilingual Education, ORANGE COUNTY REG.,
Feb. 8, 1996, at Al; Rosalind Rossi & Jorge Oclander, Chicago's Bilingual Program, CHICAGO
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model for educating ELD students is imperative in order to ensure
that language assistance programs are accomplishing the goal of
helping ELD students overcome their language barriers and thereby
protecting these students' rights to an equal educational opportunity.
B. A Prospective Alternative by Analogy
Based on Congress's findings underlying its passage of the IDEA,
a strong analogy can be drawn between the special educational needs
of the students protected by the IDEA and the special educational
needs of ELD students. The disabilities suffered both by ELD
children and children covered by the IDEA hinder or prohibit a
student's ability to participate in the traditional classroom learning
environment. In addition, both types of disabilities are beyond the
students' immediate control'2 and both types of disabilities can be
overcome, thus allowing the student to assimilate into a regular
classroom. 123 Moreover, the procedures established by the IDEA are
similar to the procedures that would be necessary to help ELD
students overcome their language barriers. 124 Given the similarities
SUN-TIMES, May 12, 1996, at 14; Venise Wagner, S.F. to Dump Its Bilingual Classroom
Integration; Superintendent Says Policy Hurt More Than It Helped, SAN FRANCISCO
EXAMINER, Apr. 6, 1995, at A2.
122. See supra note 17.
123. For less severe physical or mental disability cases, the IDEA requires that schools
provide each disabled student with the least-restrictive atmosphere and strive to incorporate
each disabled student into the general student population. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5); see also
Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305 (1988). Such a goal is equally feasible for ELD students: under this
Note's proposed legislation, each school would also be encouraged to incorporate each ELD
student into the general student population. See infra Part IV.
124. Currently, some ELD students, particularly those that are a part of a large ELD class,
are taken out of the general classroom environment based solely on the students' surname, see,
e.g., Sema v. Portales Mun. Schs., 499 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1974), and placed into separate
classes with a bilingual teacher and taught in the students' primary languages. See DESCRIPTIVE
STUDY OF SERVICES, supra note 7, at 24. This practice poses the same assimilation issues that
are addressed by the IDEA. See'supra notes 32-35. For example, a high school principal in New
York once testified that "once a child was in a bilingual program, he remained in such a
program and was never mainstreaned into English-speaking classes. Even when students
themselves asked to withdraw from the bilingual program, the assistant principal [for] foreign
languages did not grant their request." Chavez, supra note 121, at 24. Moreover, the mother of
an ELD student in a New York school testified: "My son has been in bilingual education for
five years and in special education since 1994. [He] cannot read or write in English or Spanish."
Id.
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between these two classes of students, Congress should enact
legislation on behalf of ELD students based on the goals and
procedures of the IDEA. Such legislation should require a careful
evaluation of ELD students' abilities, a carefully prepared education
plan, a yearly monitoring process, and a goal of assimilation into the
traditional classroom learning environment. Mandating such
measures would establish a concise and comprehensive program for
educating ELD children and, thus, secure an equal educational
opportunity for ELD children.
125
IV. A MODEL APPROACH TO EDUCATING ELD STUDENTS
There are three major facets of the IDEA that should be
considered when developing standardized procedures for educating
ELD students: (1) "identification," or the process of determining
whether a student's disability is covered by the act; (2)
"accommodation," or the establishment of an individualized
125. Some commentators have suggested more fundamental and far less comprehensive
methods of educating ELD students. See, e.g., Allen, supra note 1. Professor Allen suggests
that teachers who have only a few ELD students in their classroom should approach the
challenge by combining basic language-teaching techniques with attention to the students'
unique cultural backgrounds. This teaching method, however, requires the teacher to spend
extra instructional time with these few students. Moreover, this method, while potentially
effective for younger children, would not necessarily be as effective for high school students.
See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying texL
Alternatively, Congress could simply include "English language deficient" as one of the
qualified disabilities in the IDEA. The IDEA also defines "children with specific learning
disabilities" as
those children who have a disorder in one or more of the basic psychological processes
involved in understanding or in using language, spoken or written, which disorder may
manifest itself in imperfect ability to listen, think, speak, read, write, spell, or do
mathematical calculations. Such disorders include such conditions as perceptual
disabilities, brain injury, minimal brain dysfunction, dyslexia, and developmental
aphasia. Such term does not include ... learning problems which are primarily the
result of visual, hearing, or motor disabilities, of mental retardation, of emotional
disturbance, or of environmental, cultural, or economic disadvantage.
20 U.S.C. § 1401(aXl5) (emphasis added). However, the inclusion of ELD students in the
IDEA's protected class may cause confusion for school districts when determining the scope of
their responsibilities to ELD students. This may occur because the needs of many of the
physically and severely mentally disabled children are greater than those of ELD students.
Additionally, protection under the IDEA may also foster confusion for parents of ELD students
in developing their expectations of the school district for educating their children.
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education program (IEP), the implementation of the IEP's goals
through the student's educational program, and the eventual
assimilation (if feasible) of the student into the standard classroom;
and (3) "funding," or the sources from which schools may receive
financial assistance in the execution of an IEP.
A. Identification
Under the IDEA, if a school becomes aware that a student has a
disability that may qualify for statutory protection,12 6 the school must
convene an IEP team, 127 composed of school personnel and the
child's parents, to determine whether the student's disability indeed
qualifies for protection. 128 The identification of ELD students should
follow a similar procedure. States should require schools to establish
testing criteria for students at each grade level to be administered
upon the recommendation of a student's teacher, parent, or school.
States should also establish procedures to enable a child's parents to
challenge a school's testing policies or decision to place their child in
a special language program. 29 Due to the difference in severity
between the disabilities of ELD students and the disabilities of
126. There are numerous ways in which a school might become aware of a disability,
including recommendations from teachers, special aides, or psychologists, competency testing,
or a parent's request for his or her child's placement in special education. See generally
DOUGLAS BIKLEN, SCHOOLING WITHOUT LABELS: PARENTS, EDUCATORS, AND INCLUSIVE
EDUCATION (1992); JAMES C. CHALFANT & MARGARET VAN DUSEN PYSH, THE COMPLIANCE
MANUAL: A GUIDE TO THE RULES AND REGULATIONS OF THE EDUCATION FOR ALL
HANDICAPPED CHILDREN ACT (1980); DONALD L. MACMILLAN, MENTAL RETARDATION IN
SCHOOL AND SOCIETY (2d ed. 1982); see also Parents in Action on Special Educ. v. Hannon,
506 F. Supp. 831 (N.D. Il. 1980) (validating a school's use of IQ testing for placement
purposes).
127. See20U.S.C. § 1415(b).
128. See id § 1415(b). Parents are entitled to prior written notice of a school's decision to
place their child in special education and the opportunity to appeal such a decision. See id.
§ 1415(b)(1)(C)-(E).
129. The IDEA contains such a provision. See id. § 1415(b)(2). Section 1415(b)(2)
provides:
Whenever a complaint has been received under paragraph (1) of this subsection, the
parents or guardian shall have an opportunity for an impartial due process hearing
which shall be conducted by the State educational agency or by the local educational
agency or intermediate unit, as determined by State law or by the State educational
agency.
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students covered by the IDEA, and the commensurate difference
between the level of services needed to provide the necessary level of
education for these two groups of students, the identification, testing,
and appellate procedures under the proposed legislation likely will
not be as extensive as those provided under the IDEA.
B. Accommodation
Under the IDEA, if a school finds that a student has a qualified
disability, the school must first develop the student's IEP.130 The
school must then evaluate the student's progress at least once a
year131 and, if necessary, alter the IEP's goals or educational services
to reflect changes in the student's performance level.132 As the
ultimate goal of the IDEA is the complete assimilation of disabled
students into the regular educational environment, the school must
also strive to move the student to a less-restrictive environment each
year.133 In consideration of these accommodation procedures under
the IDEA, this Note proposes the following statutory language
governing the appropriate accommodation of ELD students.
(1) ELD students shall be classified as either Level 1, Level 2,
or Level 3 English language deficient depending on the
severity of their disability. Students who speak very limited
English shall be classified as Level 1 ELD. Level 2 ELD
students shall consist of those students with an intermediate
proficiency in English.34 Level 3 ELD students shall include
130. See id § 1401(aX20). The IEP includes: (1) a statement of the student's current
educational performance level; (2) a statement of the annual goals for the student, including a
list of short-term goals for daily instruction; (3) a description of the educational services that
will be provided for the student, including a statement describing the extent to which the
student will be participating in regular educational activities; (4) a statement of the necessary
transition services for the student; (5) a timeline explaining the duration of the special
educational services; and (6) evaluation procedures for measuring on at least an annual basis the
achievement of the goals established in the IEP. See id
131. Seeid. § 1401(aX20)(F).
132. See generally id § 1415.
133. See id. § 1407(b); see also Kruelle v. New Castle County Sch. Dist., 642 F.2d 687,
695 (3d Cir. 1981) (emphasizing the IDEA's ultimate goal of assimilating disabled students into
the general student body).
134. For example, Level 2 ELD would include students who may understand some words
and phrases but who are generally unable to engage in extended conversation.
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those students whose difficulties lie primarily in understanding
advanced language concepts, grammar, and vocabulary.
(2) Every ELD student shall be entitled to an IEP. However, a
school district shall be permitted to develop a collective
educational plan (CEP) for every member of a group ofsimilar
ELD students in the following circumstances:
(a) if there are ten or more students in the same language
class and each student is at the same ELD Level; or
(b) if there are ten or more ELD students in various
language classes and each student is at the same ELD Level,
not including Level 1.135
(c) The above two exceptions shall not apply to any student
beyond the eighth grade.
(3) The IEP team shall consist of school personnel, the ELD
student's parents or guardian, and, if available, the school's
director of special language instruction. The CEP team shall
consist of school personnel, the school's director of special
language instruction, and a representative of the parents of the
ELD students. 16
(4) IEPs and CEPs shall contain the following information:
(a) a statement of the student's current English
comprehension level, including assessments of both spoken
and written English;
(b) a statement of annual goals upon which the student's
curriculum will be based;
(c) a statement of short-term goals for the student's weekly
progress;
(d) a method for providing the student with a 'free
appropriate education ,137 geared to the development of the
135. In other words, if there are ten or more ELD students at Level 2 who speak different
languages, or if there are ten or more ELD students at Level 3 who speak different languages,
the school may elect to design a CEP instead of an IEP.
136. Group sizes and competing interests preclude the inclusion of all parents. The IDEA
avoids this problem by requiring individualized plans for every student. See 20 U.S.C.
§ 1401(a)(20). However, as the disabilities of ELD students are less diverse than those of
students covered by the IDEA, a representative would be sufficient for a collective educational
program.
137. This Note's proposal adopts the IDEA's definition of "free appropriate education."
The IDEA defines "free appropriate education" as "special education and related services" that
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particular student's English proficiency;138
(e) a timeline indicating the duration of the services; and
0 an evaluation procedure for the period after services
have been terminated.
(5) IEPs and CEPs shall be designed to allow an ELD student
to progress from one Level to the next Level until the student is
prepared to enter the regular educational environment on a
full-time basis.
(6) The IEP and CEP teams shall convene at least yearly to
evaluate the student's performance level and the continued
feasibility of the established goals. If a student's performance
level is lower than that anticipated by the IEP or CEP, or has
regressed from the previous assessment, the IEP or CEP team
may reconvene to discuss alternative educational methods,
possible ELD-Level demotion, a new individualized plan, or
testing for learning disabilities that may be hindering the
student's language development.
(7) A student's IEP or CEP shall be terminated only upon the
student's progression from Level 3 to the regular educational
environment. Additionally, the student's language proficiency
shall be tested one year following the termination of the IEP or
CEP to determine the student's adjustment to the regular
educational environment. If the school district determines that
the student's proficiency has regressed, the IEP or CEP team
shall reconvene to determine an appropriate course of action,
including the development of another IEP or CEP.
are provided at public expense, meet the state's educational standards, and are "provided in
conformity with the individualized education program.... "d § 1401(a)(18).
138. Courts have interpreted a similar provision under the IDEA, see id. § 1412(1), as an
assurance that students acquire at least some educational benefit, but not necessarily realize the
full potential of their abilities. .m e.g., Angevine v. Jenkins, 752 F. Supp 24 (D.D.C. 1990);
Max M. v. Thompson, 592 F. Supp. 1437 (N.D. Ill. 1984); Lang v. Braintree Sch. Comm., 545
F. Supp. 1221 (D. Mass. 1982). As with the IDEA, this section does not require that the ELD
student realize his or her full potential as a student Rather, the focus of this legislation would
be to overcome the student's English-language deficiency, enabling the student to participate at
least minimally in the educational process.
1998]
Washington University Open Scholarship
302 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 53:271
C. Funding
Under the IDEA, schools and state educational agencies may
apply for grants from the Secretary of Education.139 In contrast, most
funding for ELD programs comes directly from the individual
states. 140  However, these funds are supplemented by federal
allocations obtained under the Bilingual Education Act.' 41 At least
one bill has been introduced in Congress that would eliminate such
federal funding for ELD programs. 42 This Note proposes that any
ELD legislation should maintain the current methods of state and
federal funding. Aside from providing much needed funding, the
current national system of financing helps maintain a broader focus
on the problems of language barriers. In essence, such a system
acknowledges that language barriers impede the abilities of ELD
students to attain an equal educational experience in all parts of the
country, not just in those areas heavily populated with ELD
students.' 43
V. CONCLUSION
Today there are over two million school-aged children who have
deficiencies in the English language. 1' Some of these children
receive an intensive specialized education to help equalize their
academic potential. 45 These students typically live in large cities and
139. See 20 U.S.C. § 1406(a). The amount of funding for which a school or agency is
eligible is determined by a formula set out in the IDEA and is proportionate to the number of
disabled children in the school or state. See id. § 1411.
140. State funding sources accounted for 72.7% of the expenses associated with educating
ELD students while federal ELD funding accounted for only 9.6% of such expenses. See
DESCPiPTivE STUDY OF SERVICES, supra note 7, at 30.
141. 20 U.S.C. § 7402 (1994).
142. See H.R. Res. 3898, 105th Cong. (1997). This bill would establish English as the
official language of the United States, repeal laws requiring bilingual ballots, and rescind
federal bilingual education funding. See id. The House of Representatives passed the bill on
August 1, 1996 by a vote of 259-169. See English Language Bill Introduced in U.S. Senate,
U.S. NEWSWIRE, Feb. 13, 1997, available in 1997 WL 5710858. The Senate has not yet acted
upon it.
143. See ROSEMARY C. SALOMONE, EQUAL EDUCATION UNDER LAW 78-111 (1986).
144. See DESCRIPTIVE STUDY OF SERVICES, supra note 7, at 3.
145. Seei. at21-27.
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attend school with many other ELD students. 146 To an extent, the law
is on their side. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act and the Equal
Educational Opportunity Act can provide ELD students with
necessary educational resources when the interests of a large number
of ELD students are involved. However, the benefits of these laws
have not been extended to ELD students who attend schools with few
other ELD students. As a result of this inconsistency, this country
lacks a reliable, rigid standard by which it may evaluate the needs of,
and implement educational programs for, its ELD students.
In contrast, school-aged children who suffer from mental or
physical disabilities are afforded comprehensive and consistent
protection under the IDEA.147 Adopting an educational approach for
ELD students similar to that prescribed under the IDEA would
provide ELD students with the same educational benefits enjoyed by
students who are similarly disabled. ELD students who are either
"stuck" in language assistance programs at schools that have
thousands of ELD students or neglected by schools that have neither
the resources to implement language assistance, programs nor the
pressure to do so finally will be granted an equal educational
opportunity and a chance to overcome their language barrier-a true
disability.
Peter W. Hahn*
146. See ki at 3-6.
147. See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(1994).
* J.D. 1998, Washington University.
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